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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3830 
___________ 
 
 
PAIN & SURGERY AMBULATORY CENTER, P.C., as assignee and authorized 
representatives of CHRISTINE DENOLA, CELIA GONZALEZ, IRENE PERCIA, 
ROBERT POST, DEIRDRE SCARPULLA, and SUSAN WILAMOWSKI, 
                      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY  
 
  `    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  2-11-cv-05209) 
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
      
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on September 9, 2013 
 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 10, 2013 ) 
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In a comprehensive and well–reasoned opinion, Judge Katharine Hayden of the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (“CGLIC”), rejecting Appellants’ 
arguments that Appellants’ bills for surgical procedures at Pain & Surgery Ambulatory 
Center, P.C., (“PSAC”) should have been allowed as “facility fees” covered under the 
policies issued pursuant to CGLIC’s benefit plan.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will affirm. 
 The parties are well aware of the factual setting so we will not discuss the facts 
other than those necessary to our ruling.    
 CGLIC’s denials were based on its conclusion that PSAC does not qualify as a 
“Free-Standing Surgical Facility” under the terms and conditions of the CGLIC 
administered “Open Access Plan” in question, and the policies issued pursuant thereto.  
Appellants concede that PSAC is not a Free-Standing Surgical Facility – which would 
require it to maintain at least two operating rooms and one recovery room.  However, 
they urge that it should be included as an “Other Health Care Facility,” defined as “a 
facility Other than a Hospital or hospice facility. Examples of Other Health Care 
Facilities include, but are not limited to, licensed skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation 
Hospitals and subacute facilities.”  (App. 9). 
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 PSAC’s facility consists of one room for use as an operating room and a separate 
recovery area.  Patients are charged “professional fees” and “facility fees.”  The latter are 
at issue here. 
 Appellants urge that the District Court misapprehended the applicable standard of 
review in its consideration of CGLIC’s denials, and also improperly failed to allocate the 
burden of proof to CGLIC.  As to the merits, they contend that the District Court erred, 
specifically, in concluding that the term “Other Health Care Facilities” is implicitly 
limited to inpatient facilities.  We conclude that we need not address the issues of the 
standard or the burden because, even under a de novo standard, and even putting the 
burden on GLIC, the plain and unambiguous language of the policies, as analyzed          
by the District Court, convinces us that the District Court’s reasoning was correct and 
Appellants’ argument must fail. 
 The District Court’s opinion provides a salient analysis of the policies before it: 
 These policies state that “[t]The term Other Health 
Care Facility means a facility other than a Hospital or hospice 
facility.  Examples of Other Health Care Facilities include, 
but are not limited to, licensed skilled nursing facilities, 
rehabilitation Hospitals and subacute facilities.”  (Denola Pol. 
57.)  Taken literally, the definition would mean that 
absolutely any facility would qualify so long as it is neither a 
hospital nor a hospice.  Such a broad definition would be 
patently absurd for two reasons.  First, it would render 
meaningless the definitions and provisions for coverage by 
other, specific types of facilities, such as the aforementioned 
Free-Standing Surgical Facilities.  Second, it would make the 
“examples” provided in the second sentence of the definition 
mere surplusage; they would serve as nothing more than 
randomly selected types of facilities other than hospitals and 
hospices, placed in the list as a friendly reminder as to what 
type of non-hospital and non-hospice facilities exist…. 
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 CGLIC notes that the definition of “Other Health Care 
Facility” excludes hospitals and hospice facilities, which have 
specific definitions elsewhere in the plans.  (CGLIC Moving 
Br. 17.)  The result of double-inclusion of such facilities 
would have been inconsistent levels of coverage.  (Id. at 18 
(citing Denola Pol. at 11).)  The fact that the plan did not 
expressly exclude other already-covered facilities, such as 
Free-Standing Surgical Facilities, from coverage is a 
reflection of the fact that, CGLIC argues, “the Other Health 
Care Facility clause plainly deals with inpatient facilities.”  
(Id.)  To support this interpretation further, CGLIC points out 
that the fee schedule’s only reference to Other Health Care 
Facilities establishes a sixty-day annual cap on coverage, as 
opposed to the apportionment of payment to surgical centers 
in terms of a percentage of cost rather than the span of time. 
(Id. (citing Denola Pol. at 16).)  The Court finds that this 
explanation comprehensively utilizes each part of the “Other 
Health Care Facility” definition to demonstrate why the 
exclusion of hospitals and hospice facilities, and the inclusion 
of “licensed skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation Hospitals 
and subacute facilities,” together lead to the conclusion that 
surgical centers do not fall within the scope of the definition.  
 
  Of course, the Court need not develop and the parties 
need not explain a comprehensive framework for what 
particular facilities do and do not fit within the “Other Health 
Care Facility” provision.  The only question before the Court 
is whether PSAC qualifies.  The core problem with PSAC’s 
argument is that the policies include a very thorough and 
carefully drafted definition of a Free-Standing Surgical 
Facility.  PSAC would fit that definition if it were licensed 
and possessed a second operating room, but it is not and does 
not.  For that reason, it is simply unreasonable for the Court 
to get around these restrictions and read the plans as including 
a catch-all “Other Health Care Facility” definition that is so 
broad that it renders meaningless the detailed limitations of 
other portions of the definition.  (App. 9-11) 
 
 We agree with the District Court’s reasoning and find that Appellants’ argument 
that PSAC should be found to fit within the definition of “Other Health Care Facility” is 
without merit. 
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 Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of CGLIC.    
